I became a vegetarian diet in 2009 for purely prudential reasons. Owing to a loss of income, I thought it was better to give up meat because it would last longer with my wife as the sole meat-eater. Also, I would spend less on it as a result. This conclusion was supported by an unrelated idea, from The Monk Who Sold His Ferrari, which says it takes 21 days to install a new habit. So, my initial vegetarianism was partly an experiment and partly a cost-saving idea.
When I started cycling in 2015, it became clear that diet was important, specifically protein. So, I gave up vegetarianism to improve my protein intake. Indeed, I racked up impressive mileage in months thereafter. But a few years later, in 2019, I became vegan again after a braai. I looked at my plate and there was a mountain of meat, which seemed wrong. A few years later, this time in 2023, I was on a cycling trip from Musina to Cape Town. Again, finding protein was hard. This was especially so because I was hosted at people’s homes. Burdening them with my dietary issues seemed unjustifiable, especially given that protein was much needed. So, I ate meat opportunistically. After the journey, I became a vegetarian (no longer vegan) with a few exceptions.
My exception to meat-eating is now social. I generally do not eat meat. However, I eat it when I am at a braai, when out with friends or when I am a guest. Note, however, that my complicated relationship with meat is not philosophical. By that I mean there is no consistent argument that justifies my relationship with meat; it is just me being a complicated person. At last that’s what I think. In today’s post I take a detour from business and leadership and try to establish find an ethical principle on which to stand in relation to meat.
I will share two such ethics: first, I will discuss Peter Singer’s account of animal welfare and how he says we should treat animals, and by extension, how we should think about eating them. Then I will discuss Paul Taylor’s radical view regarding how humans ought to relate with all living things, not just animals.
Peter Singer and the Animal Welfare Movement
In the 1970s, America was undergoing a cultural revolution of sorts. All the hippies were out of the closet, experimenting with LSD, challenging the status quo and pushing boundaries in many ways. Among the threads of this mass movement emerged the idea that it is chauvinistic to treat animals and the environment as if they belonged to us (humans).1
This view collided with the long-standing Christian idea that God created man in his image and said, “Fill the earth and subdue it. Rule over the fish in the sea and the birds in the sky and over every living creature that moves on the ground.”2 Perhaps an argument can be made that this was a further manifestation of Friedrich Nietzsche’s prophecy, that “God is dead” and that we killed him. In effect, Nietzsche was saying the moral Northstar of humanity was dead. In light of this, humanity risked descending into chaos, which many philosophers think explains the madness of the first half of the 20th Century — Wars, Stalin, Mao, atomic bombs, concentration camps, gas chambers.
It is in this spirit, I speculate, that philosophers of the 60s and 70s sought to create, among others, an ethic for how we ought to relate to non-humans. Among the proponents of this new ethic was Peter Singer. In his book Animal Liberation (1975), which has sold millions of copies and revised our intuitions on the treatment of animals, Singer argues that the only morally relevant property for moral consideration is the capacity to suffer.3 Given that all sentient beings suffer the same way, it follows that the same suffering of one being ought to draw the same moral consideration as the same suffering of another being.
In effect, sticking a knife into Johnny, according to Singer, should draw the same moral consideration as sticking it into Sam, not because they share any factual characteristics, like gender, race, or the color of their hair, but only because they will suffer in the same way. Given that all sentient beings feel the same pain as humans, it follows that sticking the same knife into a cat or a cow ought to draw the same moral consideration as with Johnny or Sam. In this regard, both humans and non-humans animals, provided they have the capacity to suffer, have the same moral standing, and worthy of equal consideration where equal pain and suffering are concerned.
Importantly, Singer does not say we must treat all sentient beings the same way. Pigs must be treated differently from humans because they are characteristically different. However, where moral considerations are concerned, they must be regarded in principle the same way.
The implication is that harming other sentient creatures without giving them due consideration is wrong. For instance, keeping animals in cages (to feed humans) causes immense suffering to them, and this is wrong, according to Singer. Also, rearing animals to steal their products (like eggs and milk) is wrong because they suffer as a result. Thus, Singer advocates not only a vegan diet but a vegan lifestyle.
Respect for the Nature
Some philosophers take an even tougher stance than Singer. Enter Paul Taylor who holds that it is not just animals that have moral standing, but all living things, plants included have it.4 So, Taylor says, in effect, that plants and animals deserve the same kind of respect as humans. I will examine his argument in what follows. But first, I want to lay the groundwork for the environmental ethics that undergirds Taylor’s thinking.
Imagine, for a moment, that you are the last person on Earth and that you have a bomb that can destroy the planet. Suppose further that the bomb is so powerful that all life would die instantly without inflicting any pain or suffering. In other words, you do not have to worry about Singer’s concern for pain and suffering. Also, you don’t have to worry about the fact that humans benefit from the environment because you are the last person on the planet.
It strikes me (and Richard Routley, the philosopher who came up with this thought experiment) that there would be something wrong with blowing up the planet.4 It seems if one were to shift one’s perspective from a human-centred view of nature and think as a member of the environment, a case could be made against blowing up the planet. This suggests that there is something about the planet that has value that I worth preserving or perhaps just leaving alone.
Taylor’s project is to explain the nature of this intrinsic value and how we ought to relate to it. On his account, all living things are best understood (morally) as a teleological centre of life. Telos refers to the study of ultimate aims. Thus, the way to understand living things is in terms of the fact that they all aim at something: they aim at living and not dying, they aim at realising their biological potential, and they aim at multiplying. From this view, living things can be harmed or protected in terms of their telos. In other words, a living thing has a welfare justified in terms of life going favourably or unfavourably for it. In relation to moral agents, like humans, we can make life go well or poorly for living things in relation their telos. That is to say, living things have an interest and we can treat them according to it, and not according to our interests. Another way of framing it is to say all living things are ends in themselves and should not be used as a mere means.
Thus, we see that Taylor draws heavily on Kantian logic. The full justification for his claim is quite dense and complicated. If you are a nerd like me, you can read on, but if not, you can skip to the next section for the broader discussion, more related to the topic at hand.
To truly appreciate Taylor, we must first understand the philosophical framework from which he draws, Kantian Ethics. Imannuel Kant is widely regarded one of the most important philosopher in Western history. His ethical theory is dense and complicated. Therefore, I could not possibly do it justice here, but I will try to elucidate it sufficiently to demonstrate the significance of Taylor’s theory.
To understand Kant, it is worth talking briefly about David Hume, whom he respected, and with whom he fiercely disagreed. Hume was an empiricist, meaning what is significant and worth thinking about is what can be experienced. His ethical theory was based on sentiments. He argued that an action is right or wrong because of the feeling it produces. So, stealing is wrong because it produces negative feelings in the victim. Kant sharply disagreed with this because he thought it makes morals arbitrary. Who knows what feelings would be produced in a complex world. So, for Kant morality had to be universal and without compromise. It to stand simply because it made sense, and not because of anyone’s feelings.
Kant offers the analogy of the shopkeeper, of which I will take liberties. Suppose there was a shopkeeper attending to an incompetent customer, perhaps a child or a tourist. The shopkeeper would be obliged to treat the customer fairly, that is, sell the goods at the regular price and give them the right change because it is right to do so. In other words, if the shopkeeper treats the customer fairly because of fear of being found out or any other prudential reasons, he would not deserve moral praise. To this end, an act can correlate with the morally right thing to do without being morally praiseworthy. An act is morally praiseworthy if it is done out of duty to do the rationally right thing to do. This is The Good Will.
The Good Will is the property in rational beings that makes it possible to do the right thing for its own sake, regardless of prudential considerations, inclinations or preferences. In light of this, it is the nature of rational beings to set ends (or goals) out of personal inclinations. We are free to do whatever want. However, there are things that are morally wrong to do. For Kant, those things are the ones that violate the very principles of rationality. That is to say, you cannot be a rational being and act irrationally at the same time. Neither can you be rational and act so that other people’s capcity to act rationally is undermined by your action. That is to say, there is a universal rule that apply to all rational beings regardless of how they feel. This rule is called the Categorical Imperative — the thing to be done without question.
Kant provided for formulations of the Categorical Imperative, but all of them hint at the same general rule. One formulation is that an act is good in only insofar as the principle of the action can be made a universal law. That is to say, it can be imagined that everyone coming across the principle of that action would immediatley accept it. In this regard, stealing is wrong, not because of feelings as Hume thought, but because it cannot be made a universal law — it is irrational. Another formulation averts that we act always with respect for the humanity in others and to never use others as a mere means. Of course, we all use one another as means, but Kant specifically found issue with mere means. For instance, slaves were used as a mere means and their humanity was disregarded. This rule also fits into the first formulation insofar as using someone as a mere means violates the principle of universality. So, Kant wants us to believe that there is only one moral rule and it is to accord with The Good Will. To articulate this, he offers formulations of what it would mean to act as such.
Taylor takes issue with Kant limiting moral standing to rational beings. This would imply, drawing on an earlier analogy, that there would be nothing inherently wrong with the last man blowing up the plants, animals and the planet because they cannot reason. However, as we have already tested, there is something wrong and Tailor thinks it is the inherent worth and welfarist properties entailed in all living things.
So, Taylor revises Kant’s grounding of moral standing on rationality to the idea of a teleological centre of life. Teleology is the study of ultimate aims. Thus, Taylor refers to the observation that all living things tend towards fulfilling ultimate aims: they aim at living (and not dying), they aim at reaching their full potential as biological entities, and they aim at maximising their prospects of procreation. This telos, inherent in all living things including humans, and is the grounds for having a sense of “the good”; that is to say, having welfare, so that states of affairs can be deemed right or wrong.
Thus, we have an ethic grounded in the mere fact of being alive. At the risk of repeating myself, Taylor says being alive entails having two properties: welfare (already discussed) and inherent worth. Inherent worth induces moral consideration in normal functioning moral agents just because it does that. A good analogy is that babies induce a sense of care in normal functioning adults just because they do. For Taylor, a normal moral agent automatically thinks all living things have worth without explanation,
It follows that to view an entity in welfarist terms necessarily assumes a disinterested posture. In other words, suppose I want to kill that chicken and eat it. Because the chicken has properties whereby my encounter with it makes me view it in terms of the good of (or for) the chicken inherent in the chicken for the sake of the chicken, then I must at least consider whether killing the chicken is the morally right thing to do. In other words, the chicken has a dignity (or a value) that warrants respect (or taking seriously).
Now, we are back to Kantian territory: act always so as to respect humanity and never to use others as a mere means. Except Taylor would formulate it as: act always so as to respect life and never to use living things as a mere means. Indiscriminately killing the chicken would be to disrespect it, according to Taylor. But so would ripping out flowers from a flower bed.
On the face of it, it seems one can take a strong view that any harmful (or counterproductive) interaction with living things is impermissible. However, in Taylor’s defence, he does not speak strictly in terms of impermissibility. Taylor, rather, advocates for respect for nature. I take it he means taking nature seriously, acting appropriately in relation to it, and never simply using it as a mere means. In other words, one ought to adopt certain attitudes in relation to nature, which Taylor articulates as follows: (1) seeking to promote the good of organisms for their own sake, (2) presuming that it is a duty to promote the good of organisms for their own sake, (3) having positive or negative feelings in relation to life going well or poorly according to organisms (rather than oneself).
Taylor wants us to believe that we are not as special as we might think; we are not at the top of the food chain. Instead, like all living things, we are members of the biotic family. As such, we ought to realise that nature, of which we are full members, deserves as much respect as we give members of our species.
Discussion
These accounts support the initial objection that the Christian idea of lording over nature leads to chauvinism. If we believe we are superior, as argued by Roughtley, we believe that we can do with nature what we please. But it is quite obvious that we cannot do with nature as we please. In the first instance, without nature, we will also cease to exist. That is, we are wholly dependent on nature.
But philosophers do not want to regard nature only for its instrumental value, they argue that aspects of nature have intrinsic value, which is justifiable in terms not unique to humans. For Singer, all animals with the capacity to feel pain have the same moral standing as humans – that is, they have a welfare and an interest grounded in sentience. In light of this, Singer argues that like interests ought to count for like consideration. If it feels pain then it is a member of the moral community; if it suffers then it deserves in principle the same moral consideration.
Taylor takes it a step further in arguing that what humans find morally relevant in other humans exists in all living things. Moral relevance, according to Taylor, is grounded in being a teleological centre of life – in having a welfare and tied to that, inherent worth. It follows from this account that all living things have moral standing that is fundamentally the same as humans. Likewise, it is incumbent on us, especially as moral agents to revise our sense of superiority and recognise that nature deserves as much respect as we do for its own sake.
So, we are not lords of nature, as construed in the Bible. Perhaps that passage is better understood in terms of stewardship. It is as wrong to kill animals for fun as it is to kill another human being for fun. For Taylor it is also as wrong to destroy a forest as it is to destroy a community of people.
Conclusion
When it comes to diet, both Taylor and Singer are vegan. Taylour spectacularly exited the meat-eating club by declaring, “As of today I will never eat animal products of any kind. Never again will an animal have to die in order to keep me alive.” Singer, on the other hand, said, “Our future selves will consider meat eating to be barbaric,” I guess in the same way that we think slavery is barbaric.
As for me? I don’t know.
Until Next Week.
Vusi.
References
[1] Routley, R.S. (2013) ‘Is there a need for a new, an environmental ethic?’, Proceedings of the XVth World Congress of Philosophy, 1, pp. 205–210.
[2] Bible. (n.d.). The Holy Bible, Genesis 1:26–28.
[3] Singer, P. (2009) Animal Liberation: The Definitive Classic of the Animal Movement. Updated ed. edition. New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics.
[4] Routley, R.S. (2013) ‘Is there a need for a new, an environmental ethic?’, Proceedings of the XVth World Congress of Philosophy, 1, pp. 205–210.
[5] Taylor, P.W. (1981) ‘The Ethics of Respect for Nature’, Environmental Ethics, 3(3), pp. 197–218. Available at: https://doi.org/10.5840/enviroethics19813321.
[6] Dillon, R.S. (2022) ‘Respect’, in E.N. Zalta and U. Nodelman (eds) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Fall 2022. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/respect/(Accessed: 6 November 2024).
