“The scientist is humble in the face of nature, not beholden to dogma, obeys only his eyes, and follows the truth wherever it leads.”
— Andersen & Hepburn1
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Consider the astonishing rise and disastrous fall of the blitzkrieg — German for “lightning war” — which was used to occupy four Western European countries in six weeks during 1940. By any common understanding, the blitzkrieg can be considered a strategy. Once the Germans turned to invade Russia, however, their strategy failed catastrophically. Why?
Given the proposition that strategy is better regarded as a scientific endeavour, it should be possible to deconstruct the blitzkrieg into its component parts based on the scientific method1. Similarly, it should be possible to detect the areas where the principles of the scientific method were violated and to correlate them with the ultimate demise of the blitzkrieg. In performing this analysis, it is also necessary to appreciate the vast history and variations of the scientific method (as a formal scientific process). Therefore, for simplicity, I will narrow down the scientific method to the following general process: (1) Formulating a question: a scientist always begins with curiosity about how something works. (2) Conducting research: they then endeavour to find out what others know about the same question. (3) Developing a hypothesis: this leads to making a prediction about the outcome of an event. (4) Running experiments: the purpose of scientific experiments is to test the prediction, which leads to the last point. (5) Assessing the results: the results provide the insights from which knowledge is created.
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During the decades preceding the Second World War, Germany was under severe strain from multiple factors. Firstly, it had lost the First World War, which brought about apathy amongst the population. The Allied countries (the victors of the war) forced Germany to reduce its army to no more than 100,000 soldiers and to destroy its tanks and other advanced military equipment. They also seized Germany’s colonial territories, which were rich in minerals and other economic assets, and divided them amongst themselves, particularly in Africa. The biggest blow, however, was the imposition of reparations, which Germany paid by printing more money. This backfired and led to hyperinflation between 1920 and 19232, and the subsequent collapse of the economy and institutions.
Adolf Hitler seized the moment by proclaiming, in 1933 that:
“The misery of our volk [people] is appalling! The starving millions of unemployed proletarians in industry are being followed by the impoverishment of the entire Mittelstand [middle-class] and artisan professions. When this disintegration ultimately reaches the German peasants, we will be confronted by a catastrophe of unfathomable dimensions. For not only will the Reich disintegrate, but with it a 2000-year-old inheritance, the most valuable assets of human culture and civilisation.”3
The American economist Frank Graham2 argued that Germany was well within its means to recover from the First World War without external intervention. However, the sanctions, land seizures, reparations and other heavy-handed restrictions became the external forces that devastated the German economy more than the war itself. Graham’s assessment was made in 1930, almost a decade before the Second World War. In other words, if the victors of the First World War had not exacted such a harsh punishment on Germany, there might not have been a Second World War. Nevertheless, Hitler continued energising the German population through his speeches:
“It was not this government which led the German nation into ruin for 14 years. This government wants to lead the nation to the top once more. It is determined to pay the debt of 14 years in four years. But it cannot make the work of reconstruction dependent upon the approval of those who are to blame for the collapse.”
By the mid-1930s, Germany was ripe for a bare-knuckle fight — but there was a problem. It had neither a strong army, nor the technology or the political leverage with which to bargain. However, most of Hitler’s advisors (and indeed Hitler himself) were veterans of the First World War. I speculate, therefore that the means of righting the wrongs, at least as they proclaimed, were only possible through military efforts. This brings us into “strategy territory” where to the degree that I liken strategy to science I will formulate the Question:
Given that we [the German nation] do not have foreign-policy leverage, yet we suffer at the hands of foreign nations; and given that we have neither the military strength nor the resources to engage in protracted warfare, what is the best way to change our circumstances and restore the glory of our nation?
I do not know whether their initiatives were indeed informed by the question above; after all, it is my formulation, used to test the supposition that strategy is a kind of science. Nevertheless, it is a fitting question (step 1) insofar as it reflects the context. Then factor in the Nazis’ extensive use of spies and several other reconnaissance missions into neighbouring countries — as it were, the research component (step 2) of the scientific method; and then the lightning war itself as — the hypothesis stage (step 3).
The weakness of this analysis, of course, is that it is inherently biased towards trying to explain a known past. Therefore, it is possible that I am conveniently selecting facts which might not have been obvious at the time, and arranging them to fit my ends. Be that as it may, my objective at this stage is to formulate a framework, which I will test more robustly later.
Where Strategy Breaks from Science
At this stage of the scientific method, i.e. implementation or experimentation (step 4), strategy appears to have a crucial distinction from the scientific approach. A scientist ventures into an experiment to test and they do so, to borrow from Nassim Taleb, with an anti-fragile4 attitude. That is to say, a scientist benefits more from failed experiments, because disproving a hypothesis reveals the edges of knowledge and, ultimately, leads to a more robust theory. A strategist, on the other hand, works in a fragile environment, where failure might very well lead to the collapse of a nation, a business or even their own death. Therefore, the fragility involved in strategy, as opposed to a purely scientific endeavour, reveals a critical point at which strategy deviates from science. This deviation is important because it provides insight into the attitude or mindset of a strategist, and how they might venture differently into the fourth and fifth pillars of the scientific method, i.e. running experiments and assessing results.
Nevertheless, the deviation is not entirely outside the scientific domain. There are two branches of science: pure and applied. According to the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL)5, pure science — the benchmark we have been using in this essay to assess strategy — is interested in acquiring knowledge for knowledge’s sake. Applied science, on the other hand, is interested in solving practical problems in the real world. For instance, a pure scientist might discover the relationship between mass and energy, as Albert Einstein did. An applied scientist, however, will be interested in solving real-world problems with that theory. It appears, therefore, that a strategist is more like an applied scientist, because they are interested in solving real-world problems. Another insight is that a strategist, similar to an applied scientist, works in a noisy environment where the privilege of isolating a subject to run controlled experiments might not exist.
So far, we have established that strategy is more like an applied science, albeit conducted in a fragile and possibly uncontrolled environment.
Adversaries are also worth considering. The scientific method does not typically account for them; strategy, however, typically does. I think this is what creates fragility, and why a scientist is not necessarily a strategist: a scientist does not have to be concerned with winning. And if they are, it is because of some other goal, such as social, financial or political ends, but not the scientific endeavour itself. I am advancing the proposition that other players pursuing the same ends are an important feature of strategy, and in what follows I will examine the implications.
Suppose 2 couriers had 10 parcels to deliver in one day. How would they decide which ones to deliver first? They would certainly consider distance, first from where they are, and then develop a route. I submit that Courier A and Courier B, assuming there is no competition between them, could make different choices about the route, and neither would be strictly right or wrong if the criterion is to have all the parcels delivered. We would commonly call these choices strategies — say, Strategy A and Strategy B, representing each courier respectively. However, I think these are plans, insofar as each is a premeditated series of steps to achieve a goal, but not necessarily a strategy. So, a plan is not a strategy.
Suppose, however, that Courier A and Courier B were competing to see who could deliver the parcels the fastest. This would change each player’s approach and likely their choices. The route would remain important, yes, but they might want to gather information about one another. It might be learned that Courier A, for argument’s sake, is using a motorcycle with a small carrying capacity and, as a result, has to make several trips to the depot to restock parcels. And perhaps Courier B is using an old, beat-up car that is prone to breaking down, but has a larger carrying capacity, so that they do not need to make multiple trips to the depot. The information available to the players would shape their choices. Strictly speaking, this applies to plans as well, to the extent that information informs planning. But in a competitive environment, choices create new information and therefore alter the choices available to the players. The strategic environment is therefore a dynamic and continuous choice-making environment, where a good choice could become a bad one depending on how the environment has changed.
So, if the rule is that strategy is apt for a changing environment and plans are for static environments, it is worth considering that changes may not necessarily come from other players, even though this is typically the case. Changes may also come from the environment itself — what I will call natural changes. Winter turns to summer; night turns to day; a sunny day becomes rainy. These natural changes can invalidate a choice as much as changes caused by another player. Therefore, it is worth reviewing my earlier position on plans. I maintain that a plan is a premeditated sequence of steps to achieve a goal. However, all plans are undergirded by assumptions, so that a good plan is aligned with its underlying assumptions. And if the assumptions change, the plan should be reviewed to see if it still holds.
Earlier I offered that strategy is a kind of applied science, done in a fragile and possibly uncontrolled environment. I think this definition still holds. In the preceding paragraphs we have refined it — or unwrapped it — to reveal its inner workings. I therefore define strategy as (a) a composition of plans, (b) with an awareness of the assumptions that underpin them, (c) a capacity to change the plans when the assumptions change, and (d) an understanding that changes are caused by other players and/or nature.
By this logic, I should soften my stance on the first scenario, of couriers delivering parcels in a non-competitive environment, because their plans would still be affected by natural changes. The first scenario is therefore dubbed Natural Strategy, to ring-fence the non-competitive environment in which the participant must nonetheless account for changes in the natural environment. The second scenario is Competitive Strategy, insofar as the choices available to each player are created and affected by the other. So, we have two degrees of strategy — Natural Strategy and Competitive Strategy — and both are a composite of plans that require review and a capacity to change when the underlying assumptions change.
I can think of another cause of changes. Going back to the couriers, they would have to consider traffic as well. Traffic is neither natural, in the sense of the things changing by themselves, nor caused by another player. Traffic is caused by non-participating agents, and likewise alter the choices available to the strategist. So instead is thinking about strategy in terms of natural or competitive, it makes better sense to think of the sources of change that affect underlying assumptions and therefore the choices available to a player. I maintain that there are natural and competitive factors worth considering, and now we might add accidental factors to the extent that non-participating agents, as it were, collide with a strategy.
I am not sure whether to propose three degrees or dimensions of strategy. I can foresee a strategy based only on natural or competitive assumptions, but it can be a mix as well. Accidental factors can interfere with a strategy, for better or for worse. Therefore, it seems there are two definite dimensions of strategy, even though they are not exclusive, with potential noice from accidental factors. I will refine this part of the framework at another time.
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After its conquests elsewhere in Europe, Nazi Germany turned to invade Russia with the same blitzkrieg strategy. At first, the Germans tore into Russia, largely because the Russians were unprepared, given that the two countries had a standing non-aggression agreement6, under which they had jointly invaded Poland in 1939. However, Russia responded with a scorched-earth policy7: evacuating people, burning farms and homes, killing cattle, and destroying roads, bridges and factories. This prevented the Germans from plundering Russian lands and replenishing their resources. It also slowed down the invasion significantly. When the Germans eventually reached their target cities, deep in Russian territory, Stalin constantly sabotaged their supply lines and ordered his army, civilians and more than 800,000 women and girls8 to fight. This dealt a heavy physical and psychological blow to the German troops, who were predisposed to fighting men; indeed, some of the best snipers of the Second World War — by any measure — were Russian women. This delayed the invasion even further until, eventually, the devastating Russian winter came — incidentally, one of the coldest European winters of the 20th century9, with temperatures as low as −45 °C. Ill-equipped, ill-clothed, hungry and exhausted from a protracted invasion, the German soldiers suffered horrifically from frostbite, disease and constant harassment by Russian soldiers. The blitzkrieg failed catastrophically. Why? Let’s turn to our budding theory of strategy.
Recalling the four components of strategy: (1) What were the Nazis’ plans? (2) What assumptions undergirded those plans? (3) What changes emerged? (4) How did these changes affect their capacity to act?
First: what were the Nazis’ plans? Their plan was to invade Russia quickly and secure its oil reserves to continue waging war in Europe and beyond. Second: what assumptions undergirded those plans? Given the understanding of partnership between Stalin and Hitler, the assumption was that the Russians would not be able to respond quickly enough to the blitzkrieg and would capitulate. Because of this, the German army would plunder the countryside until it reached the capital. Third: what changes emerged? Initially, the blitzkrieg was effective, but Russia’s scorched-earth policy proved an effective response because it directly undermined the assumptions — it slowed down the Nazis and cut off their supplies. The natural changes, i.e. the Russian winter, were not factored into their plans. Fourth: how did these changes affect the Nazis’ capacity to act? Without resources, they became stranded on foreign territory and were harassed by the Red Army, snipers and the weather. The blitzkrieg failed because the Nazis had a linear approach, rather than a non-linear, interactive approach to strategy — they failed to account for the natural and competitive dynamics of strategy. Moreover, they put themselves in a position where changing plans with changing assumptions was difficult.
In science, a theory is only as good as its predictive power. So far, I have done the opposite. By a combination of inductive and analytical enquiry, I posited that strategy is an applied science, and therefore drew on elements of the scientific method to construct an initial framework. Then I realised that some aspects of strategy typically differ from the scientific endeavour. For instance, the scientific method is anti-fragile, while strategy is fragile. Further enquiry revealed two sources of this fragility: competitive change and natural change. Hence, to the extent that strategy is a kind of science, the environment in which it is done is markedly and consequentially different.
So far, I have only rudimentarily tested the framework, retrospectively, on the German invasion of Russia using the blitzkrieg. I concede that retrospective analysis does not prove the framework. However, we now at least have a framework to think about, interrogate, improve or discard entirely. Before discarding it, however, it would be worth testing its predictive power, and for that I would have to refine it even further. For now, I will pause this series and continue the discussion at another time, perhaps with results on its predictive power.
References
[1] H. Andersen and B. Hepburn, “Scientific Method,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2016 ed., E. N. Zalta, Ed. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2016.
[2] F. D. Graham, Exchange, Prices, and Production in Hyper-inflation: Germany, 1920–1923. Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1930.
[3] A. Hitler, “Adolf Hitler’s first address as chancellor (1933),” Nazi Germany, Alpha History, Jul. 24, 2012. https://alphahistory.com/nazigermany/hitlers-first-address-as-chancellor/ (accessed Jul. 27, 2020).
[4] N. N. Taleb and R. Douady, “Mathematical definition, mapping, and detection of (anti)fragility,” Quantitative Finance, vol. 13, no. 11, pp. 1677–1689, Nov. 2013, doi: 10.1080/14697688.2013.800219.
[5] Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, “Basic vs Applied Research,” Aug. 18, 2011. https://web.archive.org/web/20110818065432/http://www.lbl.gov/Education/ELSI/research-main.html (accessed Aug. 9, 2020).
[6] R. C. Grogin, Natural Enemies: The United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War, 1917–1991. Lexington Books, 2001.
[7] G. J. Royde-Smith and T. A. Hughes, “World War II – Invasion of the Soviet Union, 1941,” Encyclopedia Britannica, 2020. https://www.britannica.com/event/World-War-II (accessed Aug. 9, 2020).
[8] J. Erickson, “Soviet Women at War,” in World War 2 and the Soviet People: Selected Papers from the Fourth World Congress for Soviet and East European Studies, Harrogate, 1990, J. Garrard and C. Garrard, Eds. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1993, pp. 50–76.
[9] H. Lejenäs, “The Severe Winter in Europe 1941–42: The Large-scale Circulation, Cut-off Lows, and Blocking,” Bull. Amer. Meteor. Soc., vol. 70, no. 3, pp. 271–281, Mar. 1989, doi: 10.1175/1520-0477(1989)070<0271:TSWIET>2.0.CO;2.
