From time to time, the question of personal identity comes to mind: Who am I, and what do I stand for? These are important questions because, in one regard, they can only be answered by oneself—they are defining questions. It follows that if one defines oneself in a certain way, then one ought to live in a way that carries out that definition. Otherwise, one can be accused of being inauthentic. In other words, these questions are normative—they carry moral weight.
In today’s newsletter, I will reflect on various approaches to answering these crucial questions. I will begin by proposing that humans have the unique capacity to think about thinking (meta-cognition). Then, I will survey popular ideas related to self-identity and how to live well. Finally, I will examine the mechanism that allows us to think about thinking.
Reflection & Meta Cognition
Humans can think about thinking. This ability makes it possible for us to relate to the world not only as we perceive it but as we ought to perceive it. For example, in the Sahara Desert, there lives a people called the Tuareg. They are nomadic and travel thousands of kilometers every year in search of food and water to survive in the desert. Due to the scarcity of water, it is a rule that wasting it is punishable. Furthermore, denying someone a drink of water, even a stranger, is sometimes punishable by death.
In this example, the tribe relates to water primarily as a vital substance, as do we. However, due to its scarcity, they also relate to it in normative terms. They have rules that govern how one ought to relate to water. This implies that they not only think of water as essential for survival but also consider how one ought to think about it.
Of interest to today’s topic is this ability to think and then think about thinking, thereby creating rules about how one ought to relate to a thought. I claim that this extraordinary cognitive ability is the reason we are capable of questioning our identity and what we stand for. However, before delving deeper into the inner workings of this mechanism, I first want to address certain assumptions.
Identity Around The World
Notions of identity are treading on radical territory. Some people believe, for instance, that their sex is not determined by their biology. On this account, identity is something that one creates, regardless of one’s circumstances or biology. I am tempted to say this is an extreme libertarian view, although “libertarian” is a political term. Nevertheless, I mean to suggest it is a view that presupposes individual freedoms and the unrestricted expression of those freedoms as essential for personhood. Without the freedom to self-determine and self-direct, one is denied something essential; one is denied the status of personhood.
An alternative account is found in African and Chinese thought. In the philosophy of Ubuntu, one identifies oneself not strictly in terms of freedom (although I am not denying that freedom is important) but more in terms of one’s capacity to relate to others (Metz, 2012). On this account, freedom is important insofar as it makes it possible for one to relate to others harmoniously. Arguably, this was the evil of Apartheid—it destroyed people’s capacity to relate to each other by forcefully and violently separating them. Nevertheless, it follows that personal identity, in this view, lies in one’s capacity to relate to others, rather than being strictly about self-definition and self-direction.
Taoist (ancient Chinese) thinkers hold that the world is constantly in flux—like this today and like that tomorrow. Therefore, the way to lead a good life is to be like water, constantly adapting and having no particular attachments to any state of affairs (Tao Te Ching, ch. 5, ch. 8). The Buddhist way of life is somewhat similar, although it has a different starting point, articulated in the Four Noble Truths. They hold that (1) life involves inevitable suffering, (2) suffering is caused by attachments, (3) there is a way to release attachments—i.e., there is a way to live without suffering, and (4) this is achieved by following a particular way of life called the Eightfold Path. Both accounts recommend releasing one’s attachments as fundamental to leading a good life. It follows that their sense of identity involves “putting things down” rather than having the right to hold on to them, as in the first, dare I say, Western account.
So, we have three frameworks for identity. The first is about freedom and the rights that come with it. The second concerns the capacity to relate to others. The third involves giving up attachments and, in some sense, hollowing out one’s ego. Note, however, that all these frameworks are expressions of thinking about thinking. They involve a perception of the world and an attitude toward that perception.
Thinking About Thinking
It seems, therefore, that thinking about thinking involves at least two stages. First, one perceives the world and identifies it as it appears. For instance, I see an apple and identify it as a fruit. Suppose, however, that I eat the apple, and a voice booms from above, announcing that I have committed a grave sin. Suddenly, I relate to the apple not only as a fruit but also with the added belief that it is wrong to eat it.
It seems the first stage involves identifying something, and the second stage involves constructing meaning from that identity. Take, for instance, a toddler who sees a fire. They identify it as a distinct object, separate from others. Then they stick their finger in it and get burned. From that point on, they establish a relationship with the fire—there is now meaning involved in their understanding of fire. This implies that meaning is established through interaction with a thing.
In light of this, a thing has two distinct identities. The primary identity is shared among all who possess the same observational faculties. The second, what I will call the normative identity, concerns how one ought to relate to a thing. In the second case, we see something not merely as an object, but in terms of how one ought to relate to it. As a result, we cast judgments based on the difference between how one relates to a thing and how, at least in terms of the normative principles one holds, one ought to relate to it.
In other words, we have now established: (1) a primary identity, (2) a normative principle related to that identity, (3) an interaction, and (4) a judgment of the interaction based on the normative principle. We have an apple (1), a sin in eating the apple (2), Adam who eats the apple (3), and a judgment of Adam as having sinned for eating the apple (4).
Revising a Personal Identity
The previous section gives us a few tools for working with personal identity. First, we have an experience of the self as being alive and having certain capabilities (1). Second, we reckon with the world and, whether through experience or inculcation, adopt certain attitudes or normative principles about how one ought to behave (2). Then, we act according to or contrary to the normative principles we hold (3). From this, we judge ourselves (and others) in terms of those normative principles (4).
I think something is missing in this framework. Suppose one holds the normative principle that the ends justify the means. In other words, it does not matter what one does, so long as one achieves their goal. Then, on a fateful day, one decides to rob a bank to feed a hungry village. In this case, robbing the bank is merely a means to an end that will benefit many people. Suppose, further, that during the robbery, one kills a pregnant bank teller who tried to press the panic button. It may be, as demonstrated in Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment, that the consequences of an act can force one to revise the principles held before the action. In this instance, one might debunk the notion that the ends justify the means.
In other words, step 2 is not fixed. Also, step 4 is not merely a judgment of oneself (and others) in terms of the normative principles held, but it is both a judgment and an evaluation of the normative principles themselves. In other words, personal identity is iterative: (1) one identifies as oneself, (2) one holds certain normative principles, (3) one acts according to or contrary to those principles, (4) one not only judges (3) but evaluates (2).
I claim that judging (3) alone is a process of self-correction. However, revising (2) is revising one’s identity; it is a process of acquiring, giving up, or substantially changing what one considers to be true about the world, thereby adopting new normative principles. This leads to, in no trivial way, detaching from an old self and assuming a new self whose worldview and actions are fundamentally different.
Conclusion
Two weeks ago, I asked my professor to what end we do philosophy, and I did not quite get the answer. I subsequently stumbled upon the idea that philosophy is about understanding and shaping our intuitions. With a better and more refined understanding, one can live better.
Unlike the sciences, whose purpose is to create and refine knowledge, philosophy does not promise to create anything. Of course, a lot has come from philosophical thought. However, I claim that these “innovations” or additions to life were the consequence of refined intuition rather than a concerted effort to create something.
This is somewhat true of today’s topic. Personal identity is something we reckon with by intuition. Everyone has a sense of who they are and what they stand for. But sometimes, crisis forces us to revise who we are and what we stand for, which is a difficult process to go through. Today’s newsletter did not try to provide a guide on how to develop a personal identity. Rather, the goal was to examine the process and offer a possible understanding of what happens when we revise our identity.
The insight is that personal identity is a product of thinking about thinking. In particular, one’s attitudes toward life, as in the normative principles one holds, form the bedrock of personal identity. Changing these principles is changing one’s identity.
Until next week.
Vusi.
